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Abstract 
This article provides a comparative analysis of the salieŶĐe of GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ďilateƌal ƌelatioŶs 
to the United States, France and Britain in the German media since the end of the Cold War. 
It offers a media content frequency analysis which identifies long-term similarities and 
differences in media reporting across the three relationships as well as short-term upswings 
of media interest in each of them individually. This is relevant because the media salience of 
bilateral relations is a measure of their underpinnings in public discourse and speaks to the 
significance of domestic drivers in conducting such relationships. The article finds that 
ŵedia ƌepoƌtiŶg oŶ GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s thƌee ďilateƌal ƌelatioŶs uŶdeƌ studǇ has sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ 
increased in the post-9/11 period and that US-German and Franco-German relations attract 
far more attention in the German media than Anglo-German relations. Short-term upswings 
in media coverage are triggered by specific types of events, in particular crises in European 
integration and international military missions. 
  
  
 
The Media Salience of GerŵaŶy’s Bilateral RelatioŶs to the UŶited States, FraŶce aŶd 
Britain 
 
Introduction 
The article compares the salieŶĐe of GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ďilateƌal ƌelatioŶs to its thƌee foremost 
international partners in the Western alliance – the US, France and the UK – in the German 
media since the end of the Cold War. This stands in the context of the ongoing political and 
academic debate about change and continuity in post-unification German foreign policy and 
aďout possiďle shifts iŶ GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s doŵestiĐ foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ deďate.1 Bilateral relationships 
are a keǇ diŵeŶsioŶ of a ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ as ǁell as important building blocks of 
international politics and global governance.2 The media salience of such relationships, in 
turn, speaks to the significance attached to them in domestic political debates. Comparative 
analyses tracing the salieŶĐe of a ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s ďilateƌal ƌelatioŶs iŶ the ŵedia oǀeƌ tiŵe 
promise to shed light on the priority given to these relations in the domestic arena and to 
identify possible shifts in the attention that is paid to foreign policy issues within these 
bilateral relations. We would expect such analyses to uncover both long-term similarities, 
differences and trends across different bilateral relationships pointing to structural 
differences between them and to systematic patterns in domestic debate as well as short-
term fluctuations within bilateral relationships reflecting particularly newsworthy events 
and developments.  
Along these lines, the main objectives of this article are to offer a comparative study of the 
selected bilateral relationships of post-unification Germany and to advance our 
understanding of the domestic foundations of bilateral relations. Specifically, the article will 
make two contributions to scholarship in foreign policy and international politics. One, it 
pƌoǀides the fiƌst Đoŵpaƌatiǀe data oŶ the salieŶĐe of GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ďilateƌal ƌelatioŶs to the 
US, France and Britain in the German news media and identifies patterns both over time 
and across the three relationships. The article finds that media coverage of the three 
bilateral relations has greatly increased since 9/11, that US-German and Franco-German 
relations are much more prominent in German media reporting than Anglo-German 
  
relations and that specific events which have a high news value can trigger significant short-
term upswings in media attention to bilateral relationships. Two, the article introduces a 
methodological framework for studying the media salience of bilateral relationships. This 
framework can be applied beyond Germany and opens up new opportunities for 
comparative research into the media salience of foreign affairs which contributes to 
scholarship on the domestic politics of foreign policy more broadly. The empirical findings of 
the article confirm that the proposed methods can indeed capture meaningful long-term 
and short-term patterns in the amount of media reporting on bilateral relations. 
The article develops its argument in three steps. First, it introduces the concept of media 
salience and explores the significance of studying the prominence of bilateral relationships 
in media reporting. Second, the article spells out its methodological framework and the 
media content frequency analysis on which the study relies. The next section presents and 
discusses the main empirical results of our analysis both in terms of long-term similarities, 
differences and trends across the three bilateral relations and with regard to short-term 
upswings in media attention to each of the relationships individually. The conclusion wraps 
up the main argument and points to promising avenues for further research. 
 
Analysing the Media Salience of Bilateral Relations 
The concept of media salience refers to the relative importance or significance which the 
media ascribe to a given issue on the political agenda.3 It can be operationalised through the 
frequency of media reporting on an issue, in particular since such reporting necessarily 
involves choices between potentially infinite numbers of political issues competing for a 
finite amount of media coverage at any point in time. What is more, a rich history of 
research into the effects of media reporting on public opinion has shown that the media 
salience of political issues has a strong impact on which issues the general public ranks as 
their primary concerns.4 Not only do the media set the agenda of public debate, they also 
eǆeƌt a stƌoŶg ͚pƌiŵiŶg effeĐt͛ ǁhiĐh ŵakes members of the general public attach particular 
importance in their overall evaluation of government policy to those issues which are most 
extensively covered in the news.5 Numerous studies have confirmed that there is a strong 
correlation between the frequency of media reporting and the salience of political issues in 
public opinion.6 At the same time, the media salience of political issues also stands out as an 
  
important cue for decision-makers to identify the priorities of their constituents.7 It is a key 
part of the domestic political environment in which foreign policy is formulated and to 
which it has to respond.8 Media salience is thus both a measure of the priority the media 
attach to an issue and a good indicator of its overall prominence in public opinion and the 
broader domestic debate. While this article focuses on the media salience of bilateral 
relations, the well-established connection between media salience and public issue salience 
forms a key theoretical starting point for our analysis.  
Against this background, the significance of studying the media salience of bilateral relations 
is twofold. First, it yields insights into the attention put to a bilateral relationship in public 
debate and thus into the anchoring of the relationship in domestic society. While bilateral 
relations are mostly analysed in terms of elite-level interactions between governments, they 
are underpinned by mutual sentiments on the level of general publics. In particular, the 
long-term shape and stability of bilateral relations cannot be reduced to complementary 
interests between decision-makers, but also depend on their embeddedness in public 
opinion.9 Although the media salience of a bilateral relationship is not clearly related to how 
it is evaluated in public debate,10 high media salience would indicate that a relationship has 
a strong presence in the domestic debate and that constituents are attentive to how it is 
conducted. 
Second, the media salience of bilateral relations speaks to the significance of domestic 
drivers and constraints in such relationships. Domestic constituents, in particular electorates, 
but also members of parliaments, will be more likely to make their preferences and 
priorities on a bilateral relationship known to governments, the more the media have 
directed their attention to this relationship. Government decision-makers, in consequence, 
will more likely face possible domestic audience costs and can no longer safely ignore the 
views of their constituents, the more news coverage a bilateral relation attracts.11 As long as 
such relationships are not much taken up by the media, in contrast, governments can expect 
their foreign policies in this regard to go largely unscrutinised by the public. The media 
salience of bilateral relations therefore delimits the extent to which domestic politics, and 
public opinion in particular, will likely become a relevant parameter of these relations.12  
Studying the media salience of bilateral relations thus promises insights into their domestic 
foundations and into the role of domestic politics in conducting such relationships. A useful 
  
analytical perspective to conceptualize the dynamics and drivers of media salience, 
moreover, is in terms of a market analogy.13 Specifically, the market analogy describes the 
simultaneous adaptation processes between the main actors of the public-foreign policy 
nexus, i.e. foreign policy decision makers, the media, and the general public. On the market 
for foreign policy information, these three groups of actors exchange information and are 
mutually dependent. Political decision makers and the general public seek to realise their 
policy preferences and stand in a competitive relationship should their preferences collide. 
The media, in contrast, do not necessarily pursue a political agenda of their own14 but are 
conceived of as economic actors who strive for profit. The media affect the relationship 
between decision makers and the public by shaping its information environment, in 
particular the salience of political issues in public debate. For their part, the media are 
subject to conflicting pressures of supply and demand. On one hand, they depend on 
external sources to supply them with information, most notably political elites themselves 
who are interested in favourable media coverage. On the other hand, the media have to 
meet the public demand for newsworthy information to maximise their circulation or rating 
figures. Given the economic imperative to increase market shares, journalists and editors 
aƌe seleĐtiŶg ͞Ŷeǁs that͛s fit to pƌiŶt͟.  
According to the market analogy, the salience of bilateral relationships on the media 
agenda15 can thus be conceived of as the equilibrium between the demand for and supply of 
information about these relationships. IŶ iŶteƌpƌetiŶg the data oŶ the salieŶĐe of GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s 
bilateral relations in the German media, we utilise the analogy as a useful heuristic that 
portrays patterns and shifts across relationships and over time in terms of an equilibrium of 
supply and demand.16 Specifically, we distinguish three patterns of media salience which 
reflect how the demand for and supply of news on these bilateral relations have developed 
over time. First, the observation of systematic differences in media salience between 
GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s three bilateral relationships under study would point towards attributes of these 
relationships themselves driving the demand for information. Such attributes can include, 
for example, the historical intertwining of a relationship17, its degree of institutionalisation18 
or the international power position of the partner country19. Second, similar trends in media 
salience across the three bilateral relations over time would indicate general shifts in the 
doŵestiĐ deŵaŶd foƌ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ aďout GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s iŶteƌŶational relationships which can, 
  
for example, reflect broader changes in German foreign policy discourse oƌ iŶ GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s 
perceived role in international politics.20 Such differences and similarities between the 
bilateral relationships are both patterns which emerge from long-term observation. A third 
pattern, in contrast, relates to evidence for significant short-term fluctuations in the media 
salience of individual relationships. Such fluctuations would suggest that the equilibrium 
between demand and supply is being shaped by events and developments particular to a 
specific bilateral relation. According to the theory of news values21, high-profile bilateral 
events which display many news factors should increase both the demand for and the 
supply of information about a bilateral relationship and thus drive notable upswings in its 
media salience.  
Along these lines, the empirical analysis will explore three patterns of media salience – 
differences between bilateral relationships, similar trends across these relationships, 
fluctuations over time within individual relationships – and in how far they can be discerned 
in post-uŶifiĐatioŶ GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ďilateƌal ƌelatioŶs to the U“, FƌaŶĐe aŶd the UK.  
 
Methods and Operationalisation 
In order to measuƌe the ŵedia salieŶĐe of GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ďilateƌal relations under study we 
have conducted a media content frequency analysis. As our news source, we selected the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ). The FAZ is the leading German daily quality 
newspaper and has a moderately conservative orientation.22 With its circulation of roughly 
320.000 copies per day (including e-paper)23, the FA) is GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s seĐoŶd ŵost-read 
broadsheet, after the Süddeutsche Zeitung.  
What makes the FAZ particularly well-suited for our purpose is that it has the most 
comprehensive and elaborate foreign affairs coverage of all German quality newspapers.24 
Also, it is traditionally the most-trusted and most frequently consulted news source of 
GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s politiĐal aŶd eĐoŶoŵiĐ elites.25 Given its extensive network of international 
correspondents and excellent reputation, the FAZ is a ͞pƌestige ŵediuŵ͟ in the German 
news landscape.26  We would not expect other newspapers with a different political 
orientation than the FAZ to differ substantially in how much they report on bilateral issues 
relative to other issues. Still, we analyzed a sample of reporting on the selected bilateral 
  
relations in the center-left leaning Süddeutsche Zeitung for the first and last years of our 
period of study and found the same patterns and upswings as in the more conservative 
FAZ.27 We are confident, therefore, that our findings can be generalised across the German 
media more broadly. National quality newspapers such as the FAZ continue to play a major 
role in the daily flow of news28, especially by shaping the political agenda and serving as a 
reference for other news outlets.29 It is not the least this process of inter-media agenda-
setting30 which explains why it is still worthwhile for decision-makers and scholars alike to 
explore the news that are produced by traditional print outlets. 
The time frame of our study spans a period of 22 years and covers all articles that appeared 
in the FAZ between January 1993 and December 2014. In particular, our rationale was to 
provide a comprehensive assessment of post-uŶifiĐatioŶ GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ďilateƌal ƌelatioŶs to its 
closest Western allies that includes the watershed event of the 9/11 terrorist attacks as well 
as recent negotiations about the Euro crisis. In order to capture the media coverage of 
political issues aŶd eǀeŶts ƌelated to GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ďilateƌal relations and to avoid measuring 
the salience of the US, UK and France in the German media as such, we selected only FAZ 
articles which simultaneously mention leading foreign policy representatives of both 
Germany and the partner country in question. Specifically, we searched for the last name of 
the President (USA, France)31 or Prime Minister (UK)32 or Secretary of State/Foreign Minister 
and for the last name of the German Chancellor or the German Foreign Minister (see table 
1).33 For our analysis, we recorded the monthly number of articles meeting these conditions. 
To collect our empirical data, we used the digital archive of the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung34 ǁhiĐh ĐoŶtaiŶs all aƌtiĐles that appeaƌed iŶ the papeƌ͛s pƌiŶt oƌ oŶliŶe editioŶ. We 
recorded the monthly number of articles for all three bilateral relations, changing the search 
terms for each relationship on the day when new incumbents in any of the bilateral partners 
Đaŵe iŶto offiĐe. Thus, ouƌ aŶalǇsis pƌoǀides ĐoŶtiŶuous salieŶĐe data foƌ GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ŵost 
important bilateral relations over the course of 22 years. 
The reasoning behind our proposed method and our choice of search terms is that 
references to leading foreign policy decision-makers from both bilateral partners in the 
same article are a strong indicator that the article is indeed about issues that relate to the 
political relationship between the two countries. This rationale is reinforced by the strong 
tendency in journalistic accounts towards the personalization of foreign affairs reporting.35 
  
While the proposed method thus focuses our analysis on political news on the respective 
bilateral relationships, it does not limit the possible range of foreign affairs to any pre-
selected set of issues. We acknowledge that a potential downside of this method is that it 
may not always filter out all articles that focus primarily on human interest stories. However, 
we hand-checked samples of the retrieved material which showed that the number of such 
articles was very low and did not have a significant effect on our results. We are thus 
confident that our method yields reliable and valid results that are highly comparable across 
countries.  
 
[Table 1: ABOUT HERE] 
 
The Media SalieŶce of GerŵaŶy’s Bilateral RelatioŶs: Results and Discussion 
Following the market analogy about the demand and supply of foreign news, this section 
will present and discuss our findings on long- and short-term patterns in German news 
reporting oŶ GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ďilateƌal ƌelatioŶs to the US, France and the UK. The long-term 
perspective will serve to identify systematic differences and similar trends across all three 
bilateral relations, while the short-term perspective will look at fluctuations and upswings in 
media salience within each bilateral relationship.  
 
ComparisoŶs AĐross GerŵaŶy͛s Bilateral ‘elatioŶs: Long-term Similarities and Differences  
The long-term comparative perspective on the media salience of post-uŶifiĐatioŶ GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s 
bilateral relations yields two key results. First, the average level of media attention to 
GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ƌelatioŶs ǁith the U“ aŶd FƌaŶĐe is ƌoughlǇ siŵilaƌ aŶd sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ higheƌ thaŶ 
the media salience of Anglo-German relations. Second, the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US 
stand out as a watershed event for the amount of media reporting on the selected bilateral 
relationships in two respects. One, overall media attention to the three bilateral relations 
has increased significantly since 9/11. Two, the differences in media salience between 
GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ƌelatioŶs to the U“ aŶd FƌaŶĐe as Đoŵpaƌed to its ƌelatioŶs to the UK aƌe dƌiǀeŶ 
primarily by the post-9/11 period.  
  
 
[Table 2: ABOUT HERE] 
 
On average, the FAZ has published 28.4 articles per month on US-German relations and 25.5 
on Franco-German relations over the entire period under study (see table 2). While relations 
to the US receive slightly more media attention than relations to France, the main finding is 
the striking similarity of the media salience of the two relationships in post-unification 
Germany. This similarity becomes even more notable in comparison to the much lower 
media salience of the Anglo-German relationship which has been covered by only 14.7 FAZ 
articles on average per month which is little more than half the rate of media reporting on 
GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ƌelatioŶs to the U“ aŶd FƌaŶĐe. IŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ďilateƌal ƌelatioŶs to 
the US and France are much more visible in German public debate than its relations to the 
UK. 
These results confirm that media ƌepoƌtiŶg oŶ GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ďilateƌal ƌelatioŶs is ĐloselǇ 
aligned with the importance traditionally attached to these relationships in German foreign 
policy. In particular, the high media salience of US-German and Franco-German relations 
reflects a core principle in GermanǇ͛s external relations since the founding of the Federal 
Republic to prioritise close bilateral relations to the US and France.36 The question of which 
of the two relations should take precedence if they appear to be at cross-purposes led to 
the deďate ďetǁeeŶ ͚AtlaŶtiĐists͛37 aŶd ͚Gaullists͛38 which is still one of the formative 
divisions in the German foreign policy debate. Our findings are also in line with survey 
results on the foreign policy priorities of members of the German Bundestag who rank the 
relatioŶs to the U“ aŶd FƌaŶĐe as GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s tǁo ŵost iŵpoƌtaŶt ďilateƌal ƌelatioŶships ďǇ a 
distance.39 In contrast, the low media salience of Anglo-German relations encapsulates the 
ĐlassiĐ ĐhaƌaĐteƌisatioŶ of this ƌelatioŶship as a ͞sileŶt alliaŶĐe͟40 which most of the time 
remains under the radar of public attention. 
These results thus confirm what would have been expected from the broader literature on 
German foreign policy, and, what is more, they are highly relevant methodologically. In 
particular, the congruence of our findings with established portrayals and assessments of 
the three relationships in existing scholarship and by political elites provides an initial 
  
validation that the suggested methodological approach is indeed able to pick up on 
meaningful patterns in the media salience of bilateral relations. Also, the findings appear to 
corroborate the close nexus and mutual adaptation between foreign policy practice and 
media reporting. 
The analysis also serves as a cautionary reminder that power considerations cannot fully 
account for the long-term similarities and differences in the media salience of the three 
bilateral relationships under study. According to a theoretical perspective that builds on the 
͚poǁeƌ iŶdeǆiŶg͛ aƌguŵeŶt41, the aŵouŶt of ŵedia atteŶtioŶ to GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ďilateƌal 
relations should largely be driven by the international power position of the partner country. 
While this expectation is clearly in line with the high salience of the US-German relationship 
in the German media, it would not have predicted the (almost) identical level of media 
interest in the Franco-German relationship. The ͚poǁeƌ iŶdeǆiŶg͛ perspective also cannot 
make sense of the pronounced differences in media attention to GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ƌelatioŶs with 
France and the UK which share a broadly similar power position in the international system. 
The high salience of Franco-German relations in the German media does therefore not so 
much reflect power considerations, but rather appears to be driven by conceptualisations of 
the ͚speĐialŶess͛42 of the relationship in terms of historical memory, political and economic 
interdependence as well as an unparalleled degree of institutionalised bilateral 
cooperation.43 Along these lines, one would expect, for example, German-Israeli relations, 
ǁhiĐh aƌe geŶeƌallǇ desĐƌiďed as GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s seĐoŶd ͚speĐial ƌelatioŶship͛44 on a par with 
Franco-German relations, to equally stand out in terms of its media salience in comparison 
to GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ƌelatioŶs to otheƌ ĐouŶtƌies iŶ a siŵilar power position to Israel. 
As for the second key finding that comes out of our long-term comparative perspective, the 
Đoǀeƌage of GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ďilateƌal ƌelatioŶs to its ŵaiŶ iŶteƌŶatioŶal paƌtŶeƌs iŶ the GeƌŵaŶ 
media has almost doubled in the post-9/11 period.45 Whereas the FAZ on average published 
45.3 articles per month on all three relationships under study before 9/11, this number 
increased to 83.6 after the terrorist attacks (see table 2). While each of the three relations 
received more attention in the German media after 9/11 than before, the rise in media 
salience ǁas foƌ the ŵost paƌt foĐused oŶ GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s relations to the US and France. In both 
cases, the post-9/11 average monthly rate of media coverage was more than twice as high 
  
as in the period before. This finding is relevant, in particular, for the debate about the 
changing foreign policy discourse in post-unification Germany. 
On the most general level, the results suggest that external relations and foreign affairs 
have become a more important parameter of the German domestic political debate than 
they used to be. In terms of our analytical model, the data imply both rising public demand 
foƌ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ aďout GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ďilateƌal ƌelatioŶships as well as increasing elite supply of 
such information. This ĐaŶ ďe seeŶ as a doŵestiĐ ƌepeƌĐussioŶ of GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s more active 
involvement in international affairs and reflects trends towards a broader domestic 
contestation of foreign policy.46  
More specifically, the analysis identifies the events surrounding the 9/11 terrorist attacks as 
the critical turning point in GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s politiĐal debate about its changing role in the 
international arena. In particular, 9/11 and the following debates about Afghanistan, Iraq 
aŶd the ͚ǁaƌ oŶ teƌƌoƌ͛ have done more than any other international development since 
German unification to drive home both the increasing international demands and 
expectations on German foreign policy as well as the greater scope for disagreement and 
conflict between Germany and its international partners. This has become a recurrent 
pattern in German foreign policy which has manifested itself, most notably, in the debates 
about German contributions to multilateral military missions47 aŶd GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s leadeƌship 
role in European integration.48 In other words, German foreign policy has altogether 
become higher profile, often involving cooperation or disagreements with its main 
international partners, which sustains a higher level of media interest iŶ GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s 
foremost bilateral relations. 
FiŶallǇ, the iŶĐƌease iŶ ŵedia atteŶtioŶ speĐifiĐallǇ to GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ƌelatioŶs to the U“ aŶd 
France since 9/11 reflects the centrality of these relations to many key issues for German 
foreign policy on the post-9/11 international agenda. Significant cases in point are the 
debate about GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s paƌtiĐipatioŶ iŶ the ǁaƌ oŶ teƌƌoƌ ǁhiĐh ǁas iŶtiŵatelǇ liŶked to 
US-German relations and the controversy about the Iraq war which was framed in large part 
as a decision of the German government to side with France against the US.49 Since 2008, 
the international financial crisis and then the Eurozone crisis haǀe fuƌtheƌ pƌiŵed GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s 
relations to the US and, in particular, France in the German political debate.50 The close 
connection of US-German and Franco-German relations to such high-profile international 
  
issues and conflicts, many of which have triggered substantial contestation in the German 
domestic political arena, will have sustained a high news value of the two relationships and 
thus significant media reporting on them.51 IŶ ĐoŶtƌast, GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ƌelatioŶs ǁith the UK, 
while also affected by many post-9/11 issues, did only rarely move to the forefront of these 
debates and were for the most part overshadowed by conflicts and cooperation with the US 
and France. The next section will zoom in on more short-term fluctuations in the media 
salience of each of the three bilateral relationships. 
 
Comparisons Within Individual Relationships Over Time: Short-term Fluctuations and 
Upswings 
In order to establish what types of events or issues drive fluctuations in the media salience 
of individual bilateral relationships, we identified the most significant month-to-month 
upsǁiŶgs iŶ the Ŷuŵďeƌ of aƌtiĐles oŶ eaĐh of GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s thƌee bilateral relations under 
study. Specifically, we included such upswings in our analysis which rise above the average 
number of articles published on a relationship over the preceding six months to an extent 
that is higher than the long-term monthly average of news articles on this relationship.52 
This approach allowed us to single out the most distinctive increases in media attention to 
the three bilateral relationships in comparison to the average flow of news. Such peaks are 
of particular interest for our purposes, because they show at which points in time the 
normal pattern of media reporting is interrupted by a higher demand for and supply of 
information on a bilateral relationship. 
Using this method, we identified a total of 44 upswings over the course of 22 years (see 
figure 1). Only five of these upswings occurred prior to 9/11 which reinforces our finding 
that GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ discourse was at a turning point in 2001. It also shows that 
after 9/11, media coverage responded more to specific bilateral events or issues than 
previously, resulting in much more frequent peaks in the media salience of the three 
relationships. These peaks are crucial to our analysis because they inform us about the 
ĐoŶditioŶs uŶdeƌ ǁhiĐh GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ďilateƌal ƌelatioŶs attƌaĐt paƌtiĐulaƌ ŵedia attention.  
As the next step, we manually checked the content of media coverage behind each upswing 
to identify which type of issues or events have induced a rise in media coverage of 
  
GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s bilateral relationships. This allowed us to categorise the most salient focal points 
of media reporting on these relationships into general EU issues (12 upswings), questions 
related to the use of military force (9), official government visits (8), the Eurozone crisis 
(since 2011) (5) and the world financial crisis (2008-09) (4). A residual group of six cases 
which did not fit into either of these categories included, for example, the controversy over 
the spying activities of the US National Security Agency in Germany in 2013.  
First, it is notable how often high profile events and negotiations in European integration 
haǀe spuƌƌed upsǁiŶgs iŶ ŵedia ƌepoƌtiŶg oŶ GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ďilateƌal ƌelatioŶs thƌoughout ouƌ 
research period. Such upswings have mainly be occasioned by European summits (for 
example June 1995, March 1999, June 2007, November 2012) or disputes over the EU 
budget (for example March 1999, June 2005, December 2011, November 2012) which 
directly involve heads of state and government and which lend themselves easily to a 
personalisation of news reporting. Moreover, it is remarkable that nine out of the twelve 
general EU-ƌelated upsǁiŶgs ĐoŶĐeƌŶ GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ƌelatioŶs to the UK. IŶsofaƌ as this 
relationship attracts the particular attention of the German media at all, it is thus primarily 
in the context of European integration. This is mainly driven by cases of disagreements 
ďetǁeeŶ the UK aŶd its EuƌopeaŶ paƌtŶeƌs aŶd ƌefleĐts the UK͛s loŶg-standing reputation as 
aŶ ͞aǁkǁaƌd paƌtŶeƌ͟53 in the EU. 
Second, questions related to military conflicts led to upswings in the media salience of the 
three bilateral relations between 9/11 and the start of the Iraq War in March 2003. During 
this period, issues of war and peace were high up the agenda in each of the relationships, 
generating particular demand for information about them among the German public. Such 
issues combine many news factors, primarily because they convey a sense of threat and 
danger. Military interventions involving close bilateral partners or debates about whether or 
not to participate in such interventions can thus be expected to generate particular public 
and media attention.54 As for the relations to the US, media reporting was initially driven by 
the events of 9/11 and by uncertainty about the US response and later on reflected the US-
German conflict over Iraq.55 GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ƌelatioŶs to the UK attƌaĐted iŶĐƌeased ŵedia 
atteŶtioŶ pƌiŵaƌilǇ ǁith a ǀieǁ toǁaƌds BƌitaiŶ͛s ƌole as AŵeƌiĐa͛s Đlosest allǇ aŶd the 
negative consequences this was expected to have for European integration.56 Franco-
German relations, in turn, moved centre-stage in German political debate, because French 
  
opposition to the Iraq War was seen as critical for the ability of the German government to 
stand firm in its disagreement with the US.57 In other words, bilateral disagreement and 
cooperation about military interventions stand out as an important catalyst of public and 
media interest in the bilateral relationships involved. 
Third, upswings in the media salience of bilateral relationships can be occasioned by mutual 
government visits. Such visits are particularly visible manifestations of such relations and 
play a significant role in their symbolic affirmation. Also, they facilitate the personalisation 
of news reporting on bilateral relations and should therefore attract particular media 
attention. However, it is impossible to discern such an effect for the media salience of 
GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ƌelatioŶs to FƌaŶĐe aŶd the UK58, primarily because the large number of regular 
meetings between government leaders in the EU context have normalised these meetings. 
In contrast, visits of US presidents to Germany (for example May 2002, February 2005, July 
2006, June 2007, April 2009, June 2013) and of German Chancellors to the US (November 
2009) often sparked significant upswings in media coverage. This may be put down both to 
the greater exceptionality of state visits in US-German relations and the greater perceived 
relevance of these visits given that US presidents represent the most powerful country in 
international politics. 
Finally, the recent financial and economic crises have been another important reason for a 
couple of upswings in media reporting which clustered around the global financial crisis in 
2008-09 and the Eurozone crisis in 2011-12. While the 2008 crisis originated in the US, it 
also led to a number of high-level consultations between the German government and its 
partners in France and the UK and thus pushed media coverage of all three bilateral 
relationships. In contrast, efforts at managing the Eurozone crisis in the first instance 
involved close Franco-German coordination and thus only caused major upswings in media 
reporting on this relationship. In both cases, however, it was the sense of crisis and threat 
that increased the demand for information and the newsworthiness of GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ďilateƌal 
relations. 
 
[Figure 1: ABOUT HERE] 
 
  
Shifting the analytical focus more specifically to similarities and differences between the 
upswings in the media salience across GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s three bilateral relations, moreover, the 
general finding is that the number of upswings experienced by each of these relationships 
(12/14/18 for the relationships to France/US/UK) over our period of study was fairly similar. 
The slightly larger number of cases in Anglo-German relations can be explained by the lower 
average level of news reporting on this relationship which makes even relatively modest 
increases in media attention stand out.  
It is still notable, however, that each of the five pre-9/11 upswings in our data set relate to 
Germany͛s ƌelatioŶs to the UK. The laƌgest eǀeƌ iŶĐƌease of GeƌŵaŶ ŵedia ƌepoƌtiŶg oŶ this 
relationship took place in June 1999 against the backdrop of the so-called Schröder-Blair 
paper which resonated strongly in the German media because it appeared to indicate the 
advent of closer bilateral relations between the two countries and a broader ideological 
realignment of the centre-left in Europe.59 As was already noted above, British-German 
relations otherwise come to the fore in German media reporting mainly in the context of 
negotiations and disagreements over issues in European integrations, not least the EU 
budget. That fits the characterisation of UK-GeƌŵaŶ ƌelatioŶs as a ͚seĐoŶdaƌǇ ƌelatioŶship͛ 
to Germany, relative to its relations to France and the US.  
US-German relations, in turn, tend to see significant upswings in their salience to the 
German media either at the time of official government visits or if they involve transatlantic 
controversies over military interventions. It was precisely at the height of transatlantic 
discord over Iraq in autumn 2002 when the demand for news reporting on this relationship 
was greatest. This reflects the critical importance of the US on issues of military security but 
also GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s depeŶdeŶĐe oŶ U“ suppoƌt foƌ its oǁŶ seĐuƌity. More recently, US-German 
relations also became more prominent in German news reporting in the context of the 
global financial crisis, the NSA spying affair and the Ukraine crisis.  
The by far most pronounced upswings in media salience of the Franco-German relationship, 
finally, have all been triggered by the Eurozone crisis. The near-permanent consultations 
and crisis negotiations between the two governments coupled with a widespread sense of 
threat and uncertainty about the future of the single currency and European integration 
have significantly increased the news value of this relationship and generated an 
extraordinary amount of German news reporting on it. Thus, the five biggest increases in 
  
German media attention to Franco-German relations over the entire period of study fall into 
the narrow timeframe between 2011 and 2012. While general EU issues and questions of 
war and peace had previously caused a number of upswings, none of them matched the 
scope and magnitude of those triggered by the Eurozone crisis. 2011/12 is also the only 
prolonged time period during the 22 years under study ǁheŶ GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ƌelatioŶs to FƌaŶĐe 
were more salient in the German media than relations to the United States. The political 
significance of Franco-German cooperation in resolving the Eurozone crisis was thus clearly 
reflected in the pattern of German media reporting. 
In summary, our findings suggest that the most significant upswings in the media salience of 
the three bilateral relationships under study were triggered in response to issues or events 
which linked the relationships to major international crises, involved either conflict or 
particularly close cooperation between the partners or facilitated the personalisation of 
media reporting. Once the news value of such issues or events had declined, however, the 
demand for and supply of information about the bilateral relationships and their salience in 
German news reporting tended to move back towards the long-term average. At the same 
time, the reasons for upsǁiŶgs iŶ ŵedia atteŶtioŶ aƌe Ŷot uŶifoƌŵ aĐƌoss GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s 
bilateral relations, but can be traced to political contexts and events that are specific to each 
of the three relationships. More broadly, our analysis suggests that upswings in the media 
salience of bilateral relations are not random, but follow real-world events and 
developments which affect public demand for information about such relationships.  
 
Conclusion  
This article has compared long-term trends and short-term fluctuations in the salience of 
post-uŶifiĐatioŶ GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ďilateƌal ƌelatioŶs to the UŶited “tates, France, and the United 
Kingdom in German media reporting. It finds that the amount of media coverage of these 
relationships has significantly increased since 9/11 and that US-German and Franco-German 
relations enjoy systematically higher levels of media attention than Anglo-German relations. 
Moreover, the analysis suggests that short-term upswings in media attention to the bilateral 
relationships are mainly triggered by specific types of events, in particular conflicts and 
crises in European integration – in the case of Franco-German and Anglo-German relations – 
  
and the use of military force or high-level mutual government visits in the case of US-
German relations. 
These findings contribute to three distinct areas of research. First, they add to the debate 
about post-uŶifiĐatioŶ GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ aŶd ƌeiŶfoƌĐe the aƌguŵeŶt that foreign 
affairs have become an altogether more prominent issue in German political discourse. The 
data indicate a higher demand for information about foreign affairs in the German domestic 
debate as well as an increased responsiveness of that debate to events and developments in 
the international arena. This can be ascribed to the heightened stature of Germany in 
international politics and the growing international demands on German foreign policy 
which in turn have widened the scope for domestic (party) political contestation over this 
policy.60 The article suggests that the increased attention among the German public to 
GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ďilateƌal ƌelatioŶs is indicative of these more general trends in German foreign 
policy. It would be for further research to establish whether our findings also hold for 
GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ďilateƌal ƌelatioŶships ďeǇoŶd its ŵaiŶ iŶteƌŶatioŶal paƌtŶeƌs, iŶĐludiŶg ŵoƌe 
conflictual relations such as those to Russia. 
Second, the article contributes to recent scholarship on special relations in international 
politics. In particular, the liberal and social-constructivist strands of this research would 
expect special relations to be embedded in patterns of exceptionally close interactions and 
ŵutual seŶtiŵeŶts of ͚ǁe-Ŷess͛ on the level of civil society and general publics.61 This 
societal ͚aŶĐhoƌiŶg͛ of speĐial ƌelatioŶships, iŶ tuƌŶ, should ďe ƌefleĐted iŶ puďliĐ discourse. 
Specifically, the article suggests that the level of mutual interest and attention to a bilateral 
relationship in public debate is an indicator for its ͚speĐialŶess͛ and that the media salience 
of bilateral relations is a useful proxy for this indicator. Along these lines, the empirical data 
support the widespread characterisation of Franco-German62 and US-German63 relations as 
͚special relationships͛ as opposed to GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ͚seĐoŶdaƌǇ ƌelatioŶship͛ to the UK. It would 
be a promising agenda for future research to explore if other bilateral relations which are 
often described as special relationships in international politics, such as German-Israeli 
relations or, most prominently, Anglo-American relations, similarly stand out in terms of 
their domestic media salience. It should be noted, moreover, that the suggested measure of 
the ͚speĐialŶess͛ of ďilateƌal ƌelatioŶs iŶ doŵestiĐ debate is not restricted to ͚positiǀe͛ 
relations which are particularly close and cooperative. Rather, it should equally be able to 
  
identify relationships ǁhiĐh aƌe ͚speĐial͛ iŶ the seŶse of ďeiŶg eǆĐeptioŶallǇ hostile oƌ 
confrontational 64 , foƌ eǆaŵple ǁhat has ďeeŶ desĐƌiďed as ͚eŶduƌiŶg ƌiǀalƌies͛ iŶ 
international politics.65  
Third, the article should be a useful point of departure for future research on issue salience 
in international politics.66 Specifically, it contributes to such research by introducing a 
systematic method to measure the media salience of bilateral relations. What is more, the 
empirical findings indicate that this method can pick up on long-term trends and short-term 
fluctuations in media salience over time as well as on meaningful similarities and differences 
across different bilateral relationships. An important task for further research in this 
direction would be to establish that patterns in media salience do indeed reflect broader 
patterns in domestic political discourse and to cross-validate the suggested method by 
checking it against other data sources, such as public opinion polls, election surveys or party 
manifestos. 
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